Facts that Make one Wonder
On  January , the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (hereafter referred to as UNHCR) expressed its deep concern over Japan's deportation of two Turkish Kurds recognized as refugees under UNHCR's Statute.

On  August , UNHCR indicated that it was shocked by the forcible return of four Uzbek refugees by Kyrgyzstan. The four had been recognized by UNHCR under its mandate. UNHCR had also secured resettlement places for them.

On  September , UNHCR raised its serious concerns with the government of Turkey regarding the expulsion of  Iranian refugees to northern Iraq. The refugees were recognised in Turkey by UNHCR under its mandate.

On  April , UNHCR reported that the Turkish authorities attempted to forcibly deport  people of various nationalities to Iraq through the official border crossing. When the Iraqi border authorities allowed  Iraqis to enter the country but refused to admit  Iranian and Syrian nationals, the Turkish police took the latter, which included five Iranian refugees recognised by UNHCR, to a place where a river separates the two countries, and forced them to swim across. According to the witnesses interviewed by UNHCR, four persons, including a refugee from Iran, were swept away by the strong river current and drowned. Their bodies could not be recovered.

Commencing on  December , Thailand forcibly returned over , Hmong asylum seekers to Laos despite concerns voiced by the UN that some  could face persecution at home. The group included  people recognized by UNHCR, which condemned the forced return.

Human misery writ large, and the incidents where states fail refugees can easily be multiplied with categorically different instances: the arrest and mistreatment of Uzbek refugees in Kazakhstan, refugees who have no access to the national asylum system;  forced return of refugees without a full examination of their claims to asylum (Eritrean refugees from Egypt, Zimbabwean refugees from South Africa, Sri Lankan refugees from Ukraine, Somali refugees from Kenya, boat refugees from Italy, Angolan refugees from Congo, Rwandan refugees from Burundi);
 lack of security for tens of thousands of Sudanese refugees from Darfur (Sudan) in Chad;
 the Thai army operating a dump-at-sea policy with respect to Rohingya refugees;
 the inconsistent examination of asylum claims in the European Union, in some cases in ways that may breach international refugee law (in one country UNHCR found  identically worded interview reports, only the name of the applicant and the country of origin differed);
 the protracted nature of refugee situations, that is, the fact that over five million of the world's refugees have been living in exile for more than five years;
 and the related phenomenon of 'warehousing' refugees, meaning that many refugees spend one, two, three or more decades in camps without such basic human rights as freedom of movement, protection from violence, and the right to support their families.
 Etc.

These facts make one wonder about the obligations of states and, more generally, about the nature and effectiveness of the international refugee law regime. I will be more specific and identify the contours of a problem that will constitute the core of my research in the coming years.
Historical Background of the Contemporary International Refugee Law Regime
The contemporary international refugee law regime was built on the ruins of the Second World War. Vast displacements had occurred during the war. Major efforts were undertaken to repatriate all those displaced until it became evident that not everyone wanted to return to their respective countries of origin. They feared persecution or worse, or were simply too traumatized to be able to face living in societies whose genocidal practices they had barely survived. The practice of just repatriating them all was halted, and states, represented in the General Assembly of the newly established United Nations, recognized that repatriation should take place on a voluntary basis. Those with valid objections to return -refugees -could not be compelled to do so.
 The    future of those refugees became the concern of the International Refugee Organization (hereafter referred to as IRO), a specialized agency of the UN. In order to persuade the Soviet Union and its satellites which favoured repatriation to join the Organization, the primary task of the IRO became repatriation rather than resettlement, but its main feat was the resettlement of refugees in third states. The IRO was a highly operational organization. It described itself as "the largest mass transportation agency in the world", and it disposed of a fleet of twenty-five ships on full charter with the capacity of moving , persons per month, and comprised a staff of , persons deployed in  states.  When the IRO decided to discontinue its work, it indicated that the UN should assume responsibility for the remainder of the Second World War refugees  as well as 'new' refugees, those fleeing communist rule. The suggestion from the IRO resulted in the creation of the contemporary regime.
The Contemporary Regime in Conceptual Terms
The universal regime that was created is a beautiful one: simple, consistent, and generous, imbued by the spirit that held sway just after the close of the Second World War when the international community, still shell-shocked, was united in the desire to prevent international wars on the scale just witnessed and the concomitant atrocities with proportions that made Dante's description of hell look pale.

It proceeded from a clear allocation of responsibilities. Unlike the recent past, it would not be an international organization protecting refugees but the states hosting those refugees, preferably on the basis of the  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. The role of the UN accordingly became a very limited one. UNHCR was created -a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly -and charged with a supplementary role: providing international protection and seeking durable solutions for the problem of refugees, but in a generic and indirect sense.
 UNHCR was correspondingly set up as a nonoperational office with a very small budget and few staff members.
The regime that was created constituted a normative continuum, consisting of two instruments: the  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter referred to as  Convention), which defines the rights of refugees and the corresponding obligations of states, and the Statute of UNHCR that outlines the competence of the High Commissioner as well as the tasks that supplement those of states. The two legs of the regime were formally joined by means of the obligation of states to cooperate with UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, and substantively by means of identically defined refugees.
'   

Refugee Definitions
That is to say, the regime was meant to be predicated on identically defined refugees, but the scope of the  Convention was curtailed. First, the definition of refugee in the Convention was temporally limited and confined to those who fled as a result of events occurring before  January . The adoption of the  Protocol did not, however, signify that the regime was henceforth geared to identically defined refugees since meanwhile, in what turned out to be an inexorable process, UNHCR's mandate ratione personae had been extended. At first on an ad hoc basis: the General Assembly authorized UNHCR to 'use its good offices' to extend its assistance to those who did not come within its competence.  This authorization gave way to a more general designation of UNHCR's competence as covering 'refugees of concern to the High Commissioner'. The expansion continued, gradually but nonetheless unmistakably, culminating in a structurally expanded mandate. UNHCR's current "competence with regard to refugees covers all persons who are refugees within the meaning of the  Convention [that focuses on fear of persecution] as well as those who are outside their country of origin or habitual residence and unable to return there owing to serious and indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom resulting from generalised violence or events seriously disturbing public order and who, as a result, require international protection".
In view of the fact that the  Convention definition of refugee has not been subject to change, the definitions applied by states and UNHCR, respectively, are now worlds apart.  It is worth recalling that drafts of the  Convention suggested including the possibility to extend refugee status to such other persons as the General Assembly might determine from time to time.
 This suggestion, which would have secured identical beneficiaries, was abandoned because it would have introduced an amendment procedure alien to the conventional law of treaties.
UNHCR and the IRO, Two of a Kind
The extended definition is indicative of parallel extensions of the substantive scope of UNHCR's mandate. When UNHCR was created, the intention had been not to create another IRO.
 Instead, in accordance with the decision to allocate the responsibility for the protection of refugees to the states hosting them, UNHCR had been created as a non-operational agency. More than half a century later, it can no longer be qualified as a non-operational agency. In fact, it can hardly be distinguished from its predecessor: UNHCR and the IRO are essentially two of a kind. This identification can best be substantiated by giving some figures. The current number of staff employed by UNHCR is ,, % of whom work 'in the field', that is, the territory of  states. The organization comprises, apart from Headquarters,  regional and branch offices,  sub-and field offices. Its budget increased from , USD in  to . billion USD in .
 The number of persons of concern to UNHCR is . million, a category that comprises . million refugees  and . million internally displaced persons.
 Arguably, the needs that led to extending the substantive scope of its mandate, along with other less altruistic intentions such as retaining and expanding its humanitarian market share, account for UNHCR's evolution into a highly operational agency, a "service organization".
 Its activities comprise, besides legal protection and the implementation of durable solutions, the reception and care of refugees; physical protection; assistance in the form of providing food and water, non-food items, health care and sanitation, shelter, education, sports, and counselling; capacity building geared towards strengthening national authorities and domestic law to ensure the proper handling of refugees; the promotion of self-reliance of refugees; micro-credit loans; breast-feeding programmes; policing refugee populations; the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure in water, education, agriculture and health sectors; sustainable energy management in refugee settlements; reforestation, etc.
 UNHCR works with implementing partners, but it is obvious that the range of services is vast and its responsibilities considerable.
'   
Meaning of the Expanded Definition
Regardless of whether needs and acting upon those needs triggered the substantive extensions of UNHCR's mandate or whether eventually the structural personal extensions of its mandate justified expanding the activities of the agency to a point where it turned into the very opposite of its original blueprint, or both in a dialectical process, UNHCR now proceeds from a broadly defined category of refugees. A category that extends well beyond those who have a well-founded fear of persecution for specific reasons as enumerated in the Convention, Protocol, and Statute, and includes those who risk falling victim to indiscriminate threats to life, physical integrity or freedom.
As to determining who actually falls within UNHCR's mandate, UNHCR recognizes refugees on a collective, prima facie basis, based on information about the circumstances that caused their flight set against the applicable refugee definition,  but it also conducts individual status determination procedures. UNHCR indicates that it proceeds to conducting individual status determination when a state is not a party to the  Convention and/or  Protocol, or if it has not enacted refugee legislation, or if it did but the legislation is either not functioning or manifestly inadequate, or where determinations are based on an erroneous interpretation of the Convention or do not meet minimum standards for fairness and efficiency.
 The last-mentioned instances are particularly interesting for they suggest that UNHCR may intervene when a state does not live up to certain standards. In  -the most recent year covered by UNHCR's statistical yearbooks -UNHCR was responsible for refugee status determination in  states.
 This meant it received over , new applications that year.
 In the same year, the overall recognition rate in UNHCR individual status determination procedures was %, and that of states %. Apart from the fact that states tend to be more restrictive,  UNHCR explains the difference by the fact that it primarily carries out refugee status determination in regions where people flee military conflicts and/or human rights violations.
 In other words, the difference is predominantly caused by the divergence in the definitions that the states and UNHCR apply. The first question that immediately comes to the fore is whether refugee status granted by UNHCR is opposable to states.
Opposability
State practice may yield answers to this question. It would seem relevant to consider practice in instances both where UNHCR asserts its competence directly, that is, when it bestows refugee status on the basis of its (extended)    definition, and where it is confronted in a more indirect manner with its rather encompassing mandate.
Refoulement
The instances of forced return -the technical term for which is refoulementrecounted at the start of this lecture were not randomly taken examples. They have in common that the people who were forcibly returned to their country of origin by the country of refuge had been recognized by UNHCR as refugees. They are indicative of the fact that UNHCR refugee status is not a guarantee against refoulement.  In response to the refoulement by India of Burmese refugees who had been recognized by UNHCR, UNHCR reportedly stated that "if India … wanted to take action against any recognized refugee, their office 'could not do much'".

No extraterritorial effect of UNHCR refugee status
What if refugees who have been recognized by UNHCR leave the country of asylum in search of another, safer, state?
 Does the status granted by UNHCR carry any entitlements vis-à-vis third states?

Let us stay close to home: how does The Netherlands proceed in this respect? The court of first instance in The Hague had to address this question when a Kurdish refugee from Iraq, who had been recognized as a refugee by UNHCR Ankara, requested asylum in The Netherlands. The court, with reference to national regulations,  observed that UNHCR recognition of refugee status does not have extraterritorial effect: the state has an independent responsibility regarding refugee status determination.
 In another case the same court had to consider this question again, this time with respect to a Congolese refugee who had been recognized by UNHCR in Kenya, a recognition the refugee claimed entitled her to asylum in The Netherlands. The court reiterated the independent responsibility of the state to make its own eligibility assessment.
 In appeal, the Council of State confirmed the withholding of extraterritorial effect to a UNHCR recognition of refugee status, adding that there is no legal basis for the contrary view.
 There is no reason to assume other states give extraterritorial effect to UNHCR status determinations.
 So far, I have found only one exception -I assume it is the one that proves the rule -a judgment of a Russian court dating from  concerning an Afghan refugee who had been recognized by UNHCR Uzbekistan. The argument of the court is interesting, and rather exceptional: "once they accede to the  Geneva Convention and the  Protocol, States thereby agree for UNHCR to '    be a priority agent for providing international legal protection to refugees, with its decisions on refugee status in principle binding on all States".

The inference that refugee status conferred by UNHCR does not have extraterritorial effect, and hence does not carry the promise of protection against refoulement,  is confirmed in related instances where UNHCR proceeded on the basis of collective assessments of refugee status. Tamil refugees who fled to Europe in the mid-s were not considered to be refugees by the European countries of refuge, even though UNHCR considered most of them as qualifying for refugee status under the  Convention. It did not press its conviction home and suggested that the refugees be treated as extra-Conventional refugees and given temporary protection.
 In April , UNHCR issued guidelines advising states to refrain from forcibly returning Iraqi refugees originating from central Iraq, and recommended that they be recognized under the extended refugee definition.
 Those guidelines were ignored by a number of European states who forcibly returned central Iraqi refugees.

Resettlement blues
Another instance where UNHCR asserts its own competence directly pertains to one of the durable solutions it has been charged to pursue: resettlement. UNHCR emphasizes that resettlement under its auspices "is strictly limited to mandate refugees who have a continued need for international protection".

The reference to 'mandate refugees' should be taken to refer to those who satisfy UNHCR's extended definition of refugee.
 This means that the eligibility criteria of UNHCR do not match those of the major resettlement states, all of whom are party to the  Convention and/or  Protocol, and hence adhere to a much narrower definition of refugee. In addition, those states apply additional selection criteria,  consequently enlarging the gap between the definitions applied by states and UNHCR, respectively.
Whether setting additional criteria is legitimate depends on the meaning of 'resettlement'. Proceeding from the Statute of UNHCR, which refers to the assimilation of refugees within new national communities as a permanent solution for the problem of refugees, it appears to be the functional equivalent of the other durable solution UNHCR is meant to pursue, that of voluntary repatriation to the country of origin. Voluntary repatriation aims at reintegration in the country of origin whilst resettlement is geared to integration in a third state when reintegration at home is excluded as a possibility. Both solutions appear to signify an end to involuntary displacement and refugee status.

From this perspective, resettlement constitutes a form of immigration,
 and it would seem that setting additional selection criteria,  such as the potential for integration, is understandable.
It is a moot point whether resettlement should still and invariably be taken to signify a final solution in the sense indicated. In practice, states are not very generous, and relatively few resettlement places are offered. In response, UNHCR, maximizing the little that is available, promotes the 'strategic use of resettlement' as a so-called tool of protection.
 The resettlement state functions as the stand-in for the asylum state when the requisite protection is not forthcoming in that state. In such instances, resettlement shares the temporary nature of international refugee protection, leaving the possibility of voluntary repatriation open if the situation in the country of origin so warrants.
 From this perspective, additional selection criteria and, beyond that, the practice of 'cherry-picking', which is short for selecting the most attractive refugees, are not acceptable.
 The only difference between refugees already present in the resettlement state and those who are added by means of resettlement is that this state is asked to take in a few more refugees by UNHCR.
Beyond the issue of additional criteria, it is clear that there is a substantial gap between the definition applied by UNHCR and that applied by the resettlement states.
 As a consequence, resettlement appears to be a solution only for those who satisfy the  Convention definition rather than those who satisfy UNHCR's extended definition.
The aftermath of voluntary repatriation movements
UNHCR is charged to pursue durable solutions, and the generally preferred one is voluntary repatriation to the country of origin. Voluntary repatriation is usually governed by agreements that emphasize the voluntary nature of return. Even in states not party to the  Convention and/or  Protocol, the status and basic entitlements of the refugees they host appear to be rather secure from the moment those voluntary repatriation agreements are concluded, even if they had been denied earlier. However, the devil is in the detail, that is, when the movement phase of a voluntary repatriation operation ends and the country of refuge is faced with refugees who refuse to return home. They are usually referred to as the 'residual caseload'. Here are two examples: the Cambodian refugees -ultimately numbering  persons -who had refused to return to Cambodia in a voluntary repatriation operation organized by UNHCR were deported by Thailand using the buses that had earlier been used by UNHCR and were still covered with UNHCR insignia.
 A more recent example, dating from last year, concerns some  Burundian refugeesagain an instance of a 'residual caseload' -who were deprived of options except to return home immediately and were forced to do so at gunpoint, despite an agreement on the voluntary nature of any return concluded between Rwanda, Burundi and UNHCR.
 '   
Divergence leading to paradox
The divergence in applicable definitions may be illustrated, lastly, by means of Pakistan. Pakistan is the state that hosts the largest number of refugees in the world and has done so already for several decades. Pakistan is not a party to either the  Convention or the  Protocol. It applies a rather generous refugee definition comparable in scope to UNHCR's own definition of refugee.  Yet, UNHCR urges Pakistan to accede to the  Convention and  Protocol. This entails that Pakistan has to choose between proceeding as it currently does, that is, applying a categorically wider refugee definition than the one comprised in the Convention and Protocol, albeit without incurring the specific obligations those instruments comprise. Or, alternatively, it may opt to discard its generous practice in favour of accession to those two instruments, which means enhanced and well-defined protection for a categorically smaller group. If Pakistan were indeed to accede to the  Convention and  Protocol, what would that mean for UNHCR, which could act upon its extended mandate ratione personae in Pakistan? More in particular, what does it mean for those who do not satisfy the Convention definition but would be eligible under UNHCR's extended mandate? The issue raised touches upon one that extends beyond Pakistan: what does UNHCR's extended mandate mean when the host state abides by the narrower Convention definition of refugee? If Europe -which does adhere to the Convention definition -is indicative, it means that those who fall within UNHCR's extended definition of refugee but outside the confines of the Convention definition are not entitled to protection by virtue of international refugee law.
 They may merely qualify for temporary, subsidiary forms of protection that originate in non-refoulement provisions in human rights treaties.

UNHCR's Parallel Universe
The picture that emerges is a rather bleak one: it appears that refugee status granted by UNHCR can not be opposed to states. States adhere in principle to their own status determination procedures which are predicated on the definition of refugee comprised in the  Convention and/or  Protocol and do not feel bound to give effect, one way or another, to status determinations made by UNHCR on the basis of its mandate irrespective of whether UNHCR applied its extended mandate or its original, less extensive one. In fact, states have criticized UNHCR for acting upon its extended mandate and have viewed its attempting to do so in terms of UNHCR assuming "the sovereign state's function of deciding whether or not asylum outside the Convention    should be granted", which inhibits "the normal (and proper) functions of immigration control and de facto enlarges the effective limitation of the refugee definition in the  Convention".

UNHCR for its part simply observes that "territorial asylum can only be accorded by States. UNHCR may grant refugee status under its mandate, but it cannot provide asylum".
 As a non-territorial entity, UNHCR is forced to operate detached from territory in a universe of its own despite, ironically enough, its virtually worldwide presence in the field. In the absence of tieslegal obligations -that ensure substantive attachment,  UNHCR's world constitutes a parallel universe.
Marking the Contours of a Problem
"Refugees within the mandate of UNHCR", it has been observed, are "eligible for protection and assistance by the international community".
 In legal terms, however, the 'international community' is a non-entity: it is not a subject of international law, and hence cannot be the bearer of international rights and obligations. Taken as a short-hand term for the closest approximation of what is probably meant, it would point to the UN, in particular its deliberative organ, the General Assembly, as representative for that rather elusive notion, from a legal point of view, of 'international community'. As indicated earlier, the General Assembly is also the parent organ of UNHCR, and UNHCR accordingly has to follow its policy directives.
 In that respect, it has been observed that "the Statute is not a full statement of the legislative authority of the Office. Later General Assembly resolutions are of equal stature in setting the bounds of its mission and competence".
 Those resolutions obviously include the ones which pertain to the competence of UNHCR, and following them is what UNHCR is doing when it acts upon its extended mandate.
When states emphasize their sovereign right to control entry with reference to treaty obligations that are predicated upon a much narrower definition of refugee to ward off any suggestion that UNHCR would be entitled to oppose its extended mandate ratione personae to states,  there is something disingenuous about this curt reference to sovereign rights and limits to obligations once incurred regarding refugees. This disingenuity originates in the fact that these very same states, represented in the General Assembly, consented time and again to the extensions of UNHCR's mandate.
The first rejoinder to the charge of disingenuity could be that rather than states, an organ of an international organization adopted the pertinent resolutions. This is correct, but the fact that the resolutions are adopted by the General Assembly should not detract from the other fact that even though the '    Assembly consists of states' representatives who are meant to function as an organ of an international organization to contribute to realizing its objectives, they also simultaneously represent individual states: they have a dual role, sometimes referred to as 'dédoublement fonctionnel'. The second rejoinder would likely be that General Assembly resolutions are not legally binding instruments. Generally speaking, this is also correct. However, the resolutions concerning UNHCR and its mandate are binding for UNHCR as decisions that are concerned with the internal working of the UN -just as resolutions regarding budgetary issues and requests for advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice are binding for the UN. The fact that these resolutions are binding on the Organization, including UNHCR as an integral part of the UN, rather than states does not mean that they are devoid of external effect.

On the contrary: they were meant to have such an effect. There can be no doubt about that, as what would otherwise be the point of those resolutions? They were adopted with a view to enabling UNHCR to act upon them in the world at large (in the 'international community', if you wish). In that respect, it is abundantly clear that those resolutions cannot be dismissed as merely binding on the Organization for it is obvious UNHCR would act upon them, would have to act upon them in the territory of states, in principle all states represented in the General Assembly, and consequently would not be devoid of external effect. In view of this objective, what did states -assembled in the General Assembly -mean or intend by consenting to such extensions of UNHCR's mandate, bearing in mind that UNHCR is a non-territorial entity? More specifically: what did states, party to the  Convention and/or  Protocol, actually mean by consenting to them, that is, did they at all consider that such extensions would have (legal) repercussions for themselves?
 In view of the fact that the extensions to which they consented were meant to be acted upon by UNHCR: were those extensions perhaps meant to benefit refugees elsewhere? That is, were they meant to accommodate and support states not party to the  Convention and/or  Protocol who nonetheless generously hosted refugees who would, in the affluent west, not qualify for refugee status under the Convention and/or Protocol? The following observation of then High Commissioner Hocké suggests an affirmative answer to this question:
the vast majority of today's refugees and asylum-seekers in the developing countries of the Third World do not correspond to the formal definition of a refugee provided for in the  Refugee Convention. In other words, they are not all victims of persecution […] . They belong to the wider category of people who leave their countries because of the danger to their lives and livelihood caused by armed conflict and other forms of vio- 

He could hardly have meant that UNHCR would have to discharge the tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly in a parallel universe. (He did not: France was one of the first states to conclude a host state agreement with UNHCR; France also recognized UNHCR recognitions of refugee status regarding non-European refugees whilst its own obligations were confined to European refugees.)  More than half a century after the refugee law regime was created, it would seem the beauty, simplicity, consistency, and generosity of the original regime with its clear allocation of responsibilities between states and UNHCR has ceased to exist. The consistency of the regime has vanished as a result of widely diverging definitions of its beneficiaries affecting the original allocation of responsibilities between states and UNHCR in favour of the latter.
 Although UNHCR's mandate has been adjusted to enable it to do so, states simultaneously feel free, if not entitled, to dispense with any consequences -legal obligations -such adjustments may have for themselves, thus creating a parallel, i.e. unattached, universe for UNHCR. This parallel universe is problematic both at a conceptual level -set against the original regime -and at a practical one for it directly affects the international protection of refugees. It therefore requires critical analysis that proceeds from the fundamentals of the regime itself, including the premises on which it was created. I propose doing so in the coming years.
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